Discussion of Reasoning and Efficacy

     The creation of the initial strategy began after my meeting with the candidate about his perceived strengths and weaknesses, and those of his opponents.  Also, having known the candidate for nine years, I had a good knowledge of his record and stance on issues; thus, I was able to create an initial strategy around which all other themes and issues could center.  The story of Bernie Moorman as a good listener and clear thinker is contrasted by the story of the two incumbents seeking election:  Bernie listens to residents, while the incumbents listen to special interest groups; Bernie takes time to understand how his actions affect residents, while the incumbents disregard their concerns.  I thought it was important to not only provide voters with a clear image of the positive aspects of Bernie's character, but also to offer a vision of the incumbents, which happened to be the exact opposite of what we wanted to say about Bernie.  The initial strategy was, to say the least, rudimentary, but it provided us with a starting point to frame issues throughout the campaign.

      Just as important as determining what we wanted to say was how we were going to disseminate the message.  Personal appearances, letters and telephone calls were, in my view, the best way for Bernie to create and maintain a positive relationship with the voting public, while underscoring our message that he is a good listener and cares about the well-being of his constituents.  Moreover, if a voter received a letter or call from Bernie and not from the opponents, that also served the dual purpose of maintaining the story of the opponents; that is, the incumbents do not listen to, or concern themselves with, the needs of residents in Covington.

      Regarding dissemination of the message, I quickly realized many of my original plans would never occur.  For instance, scheduling daily campaign appearances would have been too much of a physical strain on Bernie, a man of poor physical health who had quadruple by-pass heart surgery in 1998. Also, I disregarded Bernie's bureaucratic nature; that is, I found Bernie wanting to send almost every campaign decision through a committee.  As the campaign continued, I became aware I would have to control Bernie's less admirable traits.  For instance, when campaign contributions arrived in the mail, I insisted he immediately write thank-you cards to the senders.  Apparently, he did not consider this important; three to five weeks passed before some contributors received an acknowledgment.  Almost every day I would convey my frustration.  I used every manipulation I could muster, even threatening to leave the campaign, to keep him from procrastinating what I considered an extremely easy and important task.  Finally, I ordered him to stop watching Jeopardy and playing online Bridge, and get busy with the campaign.  I said, "Everybody is doing their job, except you.  If you don't care about this campaign, why should anyone else?"  

      One significant oversight of the initial campaign strategy was the exclusion of Mr. Ray Murphy's candidacy.  Having never held elected office before, Mr. Murphy was, simply put, an outsider in Covington politics.  I believe underestimating his potential to garner significant votes as a candidate of change was a mistake.  After all, he was appealing to the same frustrations of voters as the Moorman Campaign.

      In the end the message was, apparently, effective.  Yet, the means of dissemination was not.  The method was asking too much of the candidate.  Most importantly, this initial strategy taught me to set realistic goals, and to make honest evaluations of a person's capabilities.  This is crucial when running a political campaign.  Not only did I have to make an assessment of what the candidate was capable of doing, but also the abilities and commitment level of every volunteer.  As I have learned from previous campaigns, many people have generous intentions, but when the time comes for performance they are busy, sick, out of town. 

      What was clear from the beginning was the campaign would not have the volunteers or money available to target every voter in every precinct.  A decision had to be made about where our resources would be most beneficial.  Even more, we had to discover issues important to key publics and frame them within the context of our message.


Continue to Discovery of Key Publics